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Abstract  
We investigate whether initial differences in speed of entry into homeownership lead to long-
lasting differences in ownership between generations. Our data span nearly forty years and 
multiple cycles of England’s very volatile house prices. We document that ownership rates at 
thirty have differed substantially, with a significant negative association with prices. To 
assess the persistence of these differences we use synthetic cohort methods. Measurement 
error problems – attenuation and other biases - complicate the analysis. Two methods of 
dealing with this both indicate that cohorts with low ownership rates at thirty close about 
80% of the ownership gap by forty. 
JEL Classification numbers: R21, R31  
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I. Introduction 
The birth cohort born in 1967 turned twenty-two in 1989. Some were graduating from 
university, while others had been in the labour market a few years. Most aspired to starting 
families and owning their own homes. In the United Kingdom, these twenty-two year olds 
faced a housing market in which average prices had been rising for seven years, and had risen 
70% in real terms in the last four years. The ratio of average house prices to average earnings 
was 5.5. By contrast, when the cohort of 1975 turned twenty-two in 1997, house prices were 
more than 20% lower than in 1989. Incomes had been catching up with prices, so that the 
house price to earnings ratio was 4. In short, this cohort faced a very different housing market 
than the cohort that turned twenty-two eight years earlier.1  Do these differences matter? 
These differences may matter both in the short run and in the long run. In the short 
run, cohorts faced with difficult housing market conditions may, on average, be delayed in 
‘getting on the property ladder.’ Perhaps even more seriously, these differences may also 
matter for the longer run homeownership rates of a cohort. Some members of a cohort that is 
delayed in its initial ownership transitions may find that they are never able to make the 
transition to owning their own home, and the ownership rate of the cohort may never ‘catch 
up’ to that of cohorts that faced more favourable initial conditions.  
Recent theoretical modeling (Bottazzi, Low and Wakefield, 2007) suggests that 
housing market conditions early in a cohort’s housing career matter in the short run, but not 
in the long run. Simulations indicate that disadvantaged cohorts catch up, so that they have 
comparable homeownership rates as they approach their fifties. However, these simulation 
results are sensitive to modeling choices, and so an empirical assessment of these questions 
remains important.  
In this paper we provide such an empirical assessment. We use the repeated cross 
sections of the Family Expenditure Survey/Expenditure and Food Survey (FES/EFS) from 
1969 to 2007 to answer two questions.2 First, as each birth cohort reaches adulthood, how do 
their transitions to homeownership vary with general housing market conditions? 
Specifically, if we compare two cohorts, one that faced a property boom in their twenty’s and 
one facing a property slump, how different are their ownership at age twenty-five or thirty? 
Second, how persistent are the resulting differences? That is, do the homeownership rates of 
these two cohorts converge at older ages?  
                                                            
1 Sources: Department for Communities and Local Government (house prices) and ONS (Average Earnings). 
2 The name of this survey changed in 2001, although the content and design largely continued, so that it is 
possible to construct a consistent series.  
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The FES/EFS is not a true panel, in that individuals (or individual households) are not 
followed over time. However, because the FES/EFS surveys provide us with a representative 
sample of the population in any survey year, it also gives us a representative sample of each 
birth cohort in any survey year. We use the repeated cross-sections of the FES/EFS in two 
ways. First, we hold age constant and look at variation in ownership across birth cohorts. The 
resulting age-specific ownership rate evolves over time as different cohorts pass through the 
age of interest, but will differ from the overall homeownership time-series, which is at every 
point in time an amalgam of different cohorts and ages.  Second, we employ synthetic-cohort 
methods, holding cohort constant and using the repeated surveys to track birth cohorts across 
ages (and hence over time.) This allows us to study whether cohorts catch up in 
homeownership, which is a novel contribution of the paper.  
A brief preview of our results is as follows. Over the past forty years there has been 
considerable cross-cohort variation in the rate at which different birth cohorts’ transition to 
homeownership.  Ownership rates at thirty have ranged from around fifty percent to 
approximately seventy percent.  This variation is correlated with house price developments 
over time, although that relationship seems stronger before 1990 than since. Overall, our 
results suggest that when a birth cohort faces house prices that are one standard deviation (or 
17 percentage points) above trend in early adulthood, then the homeownership rate of that 
birth cohort at age thirty is approximately 2 percentage points lower.  Third, there is strong 
negative correlation between cohort ownership rates at age thirty and subsequent growth in 
ownership: cohorts that have low ownership at thirty appear to have fast growth in 
homeownership subsequently. Historically, cohorts with low homeownership rates at thirty 
have closed about 80% of the “ownership-gap” by the time they reach age forty. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II elaborates on the historical 
context for our study, and describes the data and methods we employ (with further details of 
our data and methods provided in a Technical Appendix.)  Section III then analyses the 
pattern of ownership at age thirty across birth cohorts and how this correlates with house 
price developments. Section IV considers the question of the persistence of these differences 
in early adulthood. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Context, Data, and Methods 
Context 
This study concerns the rate at which households have been able to get onto to the housing 
ladder during the last forty years. Housing market conditions, most notably house prices, 
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have affected the affordability of homeownership during this period. Additionally, trends in 
access to finance and public policy reforms have affected the accessibility of home purchase. 
In this subsection we describe trends in average house prices, and in credit conditions, and 
also outline an important public policy programme that has affected homeownership rates (at 
different ages) in the years of the study. These trends and changes are factors that we will 
exploit, or need to take account of, in the analysis of the later sections of the paper.  
Over the last 35 years, England has experienced three house price booms and two 
periods of significant house price decline. This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows a 
quarterly measure of the (mix-adjusted) average house price for England. Over the whole 
period 1969-2009, average real house prices in England increased by a multiple of almost 
four. As mentioned, this did not happen through a continuous upward trend. House price 
booms are seen in the early and middle 1970s, in the second half of the 1980s (during which 
period average real house prices rose by over 60% in four years), and in the period between 
1995 and the early 2000s. Real terms house price falls were experienced between 1974 and 
1977 (a period which was not followed by sustained price growth until after 1985), in the first 
half of the 1990s (during which period average real prices fell by almost forty percent), and 
between 2007 and 2009. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Changes in house prices are not the only factor that have changed and will have 
affected the ability of households to get on and climb the property ladder during the last four 
decades. This is also a period during which substantial changes in credit markets took place. 
In addition, some public policy changes have been important.  
Regarding credit conditions, the 1980s was a period of substantial credit market 
liberalization. Figure 2 shows the average ratio of mortgage advance to price in the U.K. 
during the period 1969-2008. Series for all agreed mortgage loans, and for first-time buyers 
only, are shown. The series show a jump up in the ratio (a fall in average down-payments) in 
the first two or three years of the 1980s, at the end of a period in which this ratio oscillated up 
and down. There is then a levelling out (or if anything a continued steady increase) in the 
advance to price ratio until around the middle of the 1990s, with some fall after that time. The 
sustained increase of the early 1980s might be thought of as an indicator of the relaxation of 
credit conditions, although care must be taken in interpretation as this measure will reflect the 
amount that lenders are prepared to lend to a given individual, the types of individuals that 
they lend to, and the amounts that individuals are prepared to borrow. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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As is clear from the important work of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006), 
detailed modelling work is needed to accurately quantify credit conditions.3 However, even in 
their exercises, the perceived trend through the 1980s is still evident. Describing their two 
measures of consumer credit conditions between 1975 and 2001, those authors write that 
“[b]oth indices increase in the 1980s, peaking towards the end of the decade. They fall 
partway back in the early 1990s, before increasing again towards the end of the sample” 
(ibid, p.4). A close look at their indices shows that the increase during the 1980s was 
particularly rapid during the first three years of that decade.   
At the same time as the financial liberalization was taking hold, a major policy reform 
was also affecting the English housing market. This was the “right to buy” scheme which 
allowed council tenants (i.e. those renting social housing) the right to buy their properties at 
prices that were discounted compared to market values, with discounts depending on the 
length of tenancy. This became national policy4 with the passing of the Housing Act of 
(October) 1980, and resulted in a transfer of households from the social renting sector into 
owner-occupation. Figure 3 shows official statistics for the number of right to buy sales of 
local authority properties in England for each (financial) year from 1980/81.5 We see that 
there were particularly big spikes in such house sales at either end of the 1980s, with a 
smaller peak in the early 2000s; by 2008/09 almost 1.8 million local authority properties had 
been sold. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Data 
Our aim is to study the multiple housing booms and busts that occurred over the last four 
decades in England. Panel data that track the same individuals over this entire period do not 
exist. The British Household Panel Study, for example, has excellent data on housing 
arrangements, but begins in 1991. Thus, only fifteen birth cohorts can be observed at any age, 
and only one house-price boom can be studied. While much important housing research can 
be done with these data, such as about the decision to leave the parental home (Ermisch, 
1999), it is of limited use for our purposes. Instead, we use the Family Expenditure 
Survey/Expenditure and Food Survey (FES/EFS) which is available since 1968 and therefore 
                                                            
3 We in fact use their credit conditions index in Section III. 
4 Some local schemes had existed in the 1970s. 
5 For the raw data, see chart 671 via 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/socialhousingsal
es/livetables/  
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allows multiple comparisons between cohorts that experienced favourable and unfavourable 
housing market conditions in their late twenties. 
The FES/EFS is an annual cross section of around 7,000 households, who record a 
two-week diary of their spending and information about purchases of durables and/or 
expensive items in recent months prior to the interview. Importantly for our study, the survey 
provides information on the housing tenure of respondents, as well as on their income, 
education, and family structure.  In all our calculations we use the appropriate survey 
weights.  
We supplement the FES/EFS data with data on house prices and on sales of local 
authority housing through the right to buy scheme, a measure of interest rates and a credit 
conditions index. We use official Government national and (for house prices) regional data, 
provided through the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).6 The 
data on right to buy sales are those underlying Figure 3 above, while further information on 
how the house price data are set up may be found in the Technical Appendix. The interest 
rate that we use is the 90 day Treasury Bill Discount Rate7 deflated into real terms by the 
authors using the all item retail prices index. The Credit Conditions Index that we use is the 
unified measure generated by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer; it is discussed at more 
length in our technical appendix and in detail in Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). 
 
Methods 
We use the repeated cross-sections of the FES/EFS in two ways. First, we hold age 
constant and look at variation in ownership across birth cohorts. The resulting age-specific 
ownership rate evolves over time as different cohorts pass through the age of interest, but will 
differ from the overall homeownership time-series, which is at every point in time a size-
weighted average amalgam of different age groups (and hence birth cohorts).  The repeated 
cross-sections allow us to focus on each cohort as it passes through young adulthood. 
Second, The FES/EFS allows us to study the housing careers of more than thirty birth 
cohorts through synthetic cohort analysis. The basic idea of synthetic cohort analysis is as 
follows. With repeated cross sections we cannot track individuals over time. However, in 
each survey year we get a representative sample from each birth cohort, and so by using 
                                                            
6 See:  
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/housingmarket/li
vetables/ 
7 This measure was chosen because consistent data are available for a long time period. For the period in which 
data overlap it is very close to the Bank of England base rate 
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successive cross sections, we can follow the average characteristics of a birth cohort through 
time. In particular, for any birth cohort, we can estimate its ownership rate in every survey 
year and hence at different ages. Myers (1999, 2001) has emphasized the importance of 
accounting for cohort effects in the analysis of housing careers, and the utility of cohort 
studies as an important alternative to cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches to exploring 
housing patterns. At the same time, cohort analysis often offers a longer time span than does 
the available panel data (as is the case here); in addition, the use of repeated cross-sections to 
follow synthetic cohorts avoids the  attrition and small sample problems that often limit panel 
data analyses.  
 With thirty-nine FES/EFS surveys available to us (1969-2007) we can potentially 
follow some cohorts for thirty-nine years. However, we largely focus on ages thirty to fifty. 
Although the FES/EFS are household surveys, we believe the appropriate unit of 
analysis is the individual and in this study we follow cohorts of individuals. Although it takes 
some care, birth cohorts of individuals can be constructed from the FES/EFS. The concept of 
a “household life-cycle” is commonplace in economic studies, but such an approach has 
several drawbacks. A household is a collection of individuals, each of whom may belong to 
different cohorts and, at any given time, may be at a different stage of the life-cycle. 
Although the ambiguity of a “household life-cycle” is well recognized, this ambiguity is often 
ignored because of the potential complexity of discerning individual profiles of household 
members from household data. 
Moreover, many transitions in housing arrangements are associated with household 
formation or dissolution or with changes in household composition. Recent NHPAU research 
on affordability has focussed on the issue of household formation (NHPAU, 2008). Myers 
(1990) explains this concern with following the housing careers of households: “[w]hereas 
most housing research begins with the behaviour of households, the logical prior concern in 
this type of research is with the formation of households from a population” (p. 14). Housing 
studies that followed housing choices of (cohorts of) couples would miss much of the 
important action. 
Instead, in this study, we follow cohorts of individuals. We do this separately for birth 
cohorts of men and women. To generate individual birth cohorts from household data, we 
create individual observations whenever we see an individual of a certain age and gender in a 
household record. The FES/EFS contains information on household and individual 
characteristics thus allowing us to create detailed records from which to construct individual 
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birth cohorts for adults of all ages. Hence we will be able to track changes in housing tenure 
alongside changes in family composition for both men and women. 
When structuring the data into cohorts of individuals, some care is required with 
allocating homeownership. We take ownership to be a shared state, so that if we see a couple 
living in a property that is owned (with a mortgage or outright) by either member of the 
couple, then our data records both members of the couple as being owner-occupiers. Thus 
when we consider counts of individuals, both of these individuals will be counted as owners. 
However, we do not necessarily allocate the same ownership status to all members of a 
household. In particular, we are careful about how we allocate ownership for young adults 
who are still living in the parental home. Such individuals will appear as observations in our 
dataset, which includes all adults. However, even if the data record that the parents own their 
home, our analysis does not treat the children as home-owners. Recording ownership state in 
this way ensures that there is not an apparent fall in ownership in the early and middle 
twenties as individuals move out of home (often into the rental sector), followed by an 
increase when the same individuals become (first-time) buyers. 
In our analysis, we sometimes interpret the increase in the homeownership rate for a 
given cohort as the proportion of that group that became home owners between one year and 
the next. That is, we interpret this change as the gross flow in to housing between one year 
and the next. However, the flow that we observe is actually the net flow. That is, it is the 
number moving into homeownership, net of the number transiting in the other direction back 
in to the rental sector. This net flow provides a close approximation to the gross flow if the 
number of individuals buying houses is much larger than the number of individuals in the 
same group (of the same age) who move from being owners back into the rental sector.  
We undertook some preliminary analysis of this issue using the BHPS. Because the 
BHPS is a true panel, both gross and net flows are observed directly. Fortunately, for 
individuals in the age ranges that we are considering, net flows approximate gross flows quite 
closely.  Among individuals in their twenties, there are relatively few individuals transiting 
back into renting because relatively few already own. Around age thirty the proportion of 
owners that switch to renting is around 2%, and this tends to decline with age throughout the 
working life (being around 1% at age forty). Thus, though home-owners are in the majority at 
these ages, the numbers switching back to rental remains very small.8 We can, therefore, treat 
the observed net flow to ownership, as a close approximation to the gross flow, and we do 
this throughout the paper. 
                                                            
8 Full details are available on request. 
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The size of the FES/EFS dataset allows us to split our analyses by region. Regional 
analysis is of independent interest; moreover, splitting by region potentially provides 
additional variation in prices to exploit. However, the synthetic cohort part of our analysis 
rests on the assumption that the composition of the cohort being followed is fixed over time. 
This assumption might be undermined if migration flows between regions are sufficiently 
large.  We have investigated this issue empirically and concluded that it is reasonable to 
follow cohorts defined by birth-year and region. Further details are provided in the Technical 
Appendix.  
 
III. Getting on the Housing Ladder: Homeownership at thirty 
We begin by calculating the homeownership rate of men and women aged twenty-nine to 
thirty-one for every year in the data. Figures 4 and 5 display homeownership rates for thirty-
year olds through time. Figure 4 shows the ownership rate across all individuals of that age. 
Figure 5(a) considers men and women separately. Figure 5(b) compares the North, South and 
Midlands regions to all of England. Figure 5(c) compares those individuals living as a 
member of a couple to all individuals. For each of these figures, the ownership rates were 
calculated using survey weights so that resulting rates are representative of the population of 
interest. The ownership rates are displayed alongside the (log) real house price series for this 
period (the same price data that were displayed in Figure 1, but at an annual frequency). The 
house price series is in red and the house price boom that began in the mid 1990s is clear in 
the graphs. In each figure the ownership series are in green or blue. Note that because we are 
holding age constant, the x-axis measures both survey year and birth cohort: thirty year-olds 
in 1970 are from the 1940 birth cohort and so on.   
Over the past forty years there has been considerable cross-cohort variation in the rate 
at which different birth cohorts’ transit to homeownership. Figure 4 shows that ownership 
rates at thirty range from around 50 percent to approximately 70 percent, with both up and 
down swings. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The data in Figure 4 do suggest a relationship such that high prices coincide with low 
ownership among thirty-year olds, particularly before 1990. The peaks and troughs in prices 
before the mid 1980s approximately correspond to troughs and peaks in the age-thirty 
ownership rate. It is also the case that the strong run up in the house price after 1995 is 
associated with a downward drift in age-thirty ownership (although this downward drift did 
begin before house prices began to climb). However, between 1980 and 1985 the noticeable 
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feature of the data is a strong surge in the age-thirty ownership rate, from around fifty-five 
percent, past its previous peak of almost sixty percent, and up to almost seventy percent. 
While this increase seemed to reverse somewhat as house prices began to grow rapidly in 
1986 and 1987, it is worth noting that the reverse began before prices reached their peak in 
the late 1980s, but, as already noted, turned to a secular decline even while prices were 
falling at the beginning of the 1990s. It is likely that pressures other than prices – such as the 
already noted credit liberalization, and the “right to buy” policy – were affecting ownership 
rates strongly at some points between 1980 and the early 1990s, and in the figure this swamps 
the effect of the price on affordability.   
[Figure 5(a) and 5(b) about here] 
Figure 5(a) shows that the patterns of ownership rates for men and women aged thirty 
are quite similar. Some of the swings up and down in the ownership rate during the first part 
of the period were more marked for women than men, but the downward trend since 1990 
seems more marked among men than among women.  
Figure 5(b) repeats the analysis by region. It shows that broadly the same patterns are 
observed in the North (top-right panel), Midlands (bottom-left) and South (bottom-right) as in 
England overall (top-left). However, the variations in both ownership rates and house prices 
are more pronounced in the South than elsewhere, and recent decline in ownership rates at 
thirty is particularly precipitous in the south.  
[Figure 5(c) about here. ] 
The right-hand panel of Figure 5(c) shows the trends only for those individuals in 
couples. Unsurprisingly, individuals in couples are more likely to be owners than is a random 
individual drawn from the whole population of thirty year-olds. Moreover, the ownership rate 
among thirty year-olds in couples has also declined less rapidly after 1990 than the ownership 
rate among all thirty year-olds. The trends for those in couples need not be the same as those 
for all individuals as those in couples  are only a subset of the population, and because the 
proportion of the population who are living as part of a couple has been falling over time. The 
contrast between the left- and right-hand panels of Figure 5 (c) suggests that the secular 
decline in ownership at thirty which has occurred since the early 1990s is related to the 
changing fraction of thirty year-olds in couples. This is further explored in Figure 6.  
[Figure 6 about here] 
A simple accounting identity is that: 
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Ownership rate of 30 year-olds = 
Fraction in a couple  x  ownership rate among coupled 30 year-olds  
+  Fraction single  x  ownership rate among single 30 year olds 
 
Figure 6 shows that the ownership rate among coupled thirty-year olds has changed 
little since 1990. The ownership rate of single thirty-year olds has fallen a bit more. Young 
coupled individuals have always had higher ownership rates than young singles, and the 
proportion of thirty-year olds in couples has been falling (from over eighty percent in the 
1970s, to around two-thirds in the early 1990s.) This accounts for a substantial component of 
the fall in the overall ownership rate of thirty-year olds.  
While this observation provides a mechanical explanation of how the recent decline in 
ownership at thirty has occurred, a causal inference should not be drawn. It could be, for 
example, that the decline in the fraction of thirty year-olds who are a member of couple has 
been driven by a declining affordability of homeownership. The direction of causation is 
unclear.    
To quantify the relationship between house prices and ownership at thirty observed in 
these Figures, we now turn to probit models for homeownership. Probit or logit models for 
homeownership (tenure choice) estimated on micro-data are well known in the literature. For 
example, Linneman and Wachter (1989) estimate Logit models for homeownership on 
American microdata, with a particular focus on wealth constraints. Hilber and Liu (2008) also 
estimate a logit mode of tenure on American microdata but focusing on the roles of own and 
parental wealth, and location preference in explaining the black-white ownership gap in 
America. Bourassa and Hoesli, (2010) estimate a logistic regression for tenure choice on 
Swiss microdata focusing on wealth constraints and the relative costs of owning and renting.  
Our analysis is differentiated from these papers and the related literature by our use of 
data spanning a much longer period (and therefore, affording much more temporal variation 
in prices), and by our focus particularly on ownership at age thirty. The papers cited above 
pool households of a range of ages. They do typically include age variables among the 
demographic controls in their tenure choice models. But the linear index models they use 
constrain the estimated relationship between tenure choice and other variables (for example 
prices) to evolve with age in a very particular way. By focusing very narrowly on young 
adults, we can estimate the correlates of ownership at age thirty without constraining the 
parameters to fit the choices of other age groups. Against this, a number of the papers cited 
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above model the relative costs of ownership and rent, or the wealth and credit constraints, in 
more detail than we do here. Like Hilber and Liu, we take reduced form approach.   
Estimates of three probit models of homewnership at age 30 are reported in Table 1. 
All are based on pooled data on individuals from many waves of the FES/EFS. In all three 
cases the dependent variable is whether or not the individual owns a property at age thirty.  
They differ by the set of conditioning variables and the range of years of data employed. The 
latter is driven by the former: in each case we use all the years for which data on the included 
conditioning variables are available. As always we make appropriate use of survey weights. 
Standard errors are clustered on the region-year level to appropriately reflect the structure of 
our data.  
All three models contain a linear time trend. Because we control for a linear trend, the 
estimated effect of house prices reflects the effect of deviations in house prices from a linear 
trend. They also contain the real interest rate as a measure of the cost of homeownership.  
The models also include two variables measuring the number of “right to buy” sales 
of local authority housing in England. These two variables are intended to capture the impact 
of right to buy on the number of properties up for sale in a particular year, and on the size of 
the stock of properties in the owner-occupied sector, and respectively measure the number of 
right to buy sales (in hundreds of thousands) in the (financial) year in which an individual is 
observed and the cumulative number of sales (again in hundreds of thousands) since the right 
to buy became a national scheme in late 1980. Given the years in which the right to buy has 
been an active policy, it is possible that our right to buy variables also pick up some effects of 
the financial market changes discussed in the first part of Section II.9     
Additional controls that are common to all three models include the gender of the 
individual and whether he or she is a member of a couple; the log of family income; the 
number of children; and the log real house price, which is our main interest.  
The first model (in the left-most column) is our base specification and it is estimated 
on pooled data from 1969 to 1997. The second model (in the middle column) adds a measure 
of the individual’s education and is estimated on data from 1978 on (when education began to 
be recorded in the FES/EFS.) The third model (in the far-right column) adds, in addition to 
education, the credit conditions index developed by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer 
                                                            
9  We experimented with also including a variable indicating that an observation is from 1981 or after, but when 
included alongside the right to buy variables, all three were not separately statistically significant. We chose to 
keep the more interpretable measures of the impact of the policy. 
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(2006). As we have this variable only until 2005, this model is estimated on pooled data from 
1978 to 2005.10  
The variable for right to buy sales this year is significant in all specifications and the 
variable recording the cumulative number of sales is significant in the 2nd and 3rd 
specification; the estimates relating to these variables suggest that ownership at thirty has 
tended to be higher in years with greater numbers of right to buy sales, and higher still in later 
years for which the cumulative number of right to buy sales is greater. Unsurprisingly, family 
income and family characteristics (couple and number of children) are also strongly and 
significantly associated with homeownership.  
The log real house price variable is also significant and has a negative sign in all three 
specifications, indicating that higher prices are associated with lower ownership rates among 
thirty year-olds. This finding accords with the idea that a higher price makes homeownership 
less affordable for thirty year olds. In the first column, the marginal effect on the price 
variable suggests that if the house price is one standard deviation – or 17 percentage points – 
above trend, then homeownership would be slightly more than 3 percentage points11 lower.  
The corresponding marginal effect in Column 2 is slightly smaller, suggesting an ownership 
rate at thirty approximately 2 percentage points lower for every standard deviation that prices 
are above trend. The marginal effect in the third specification lies between the first two.  
We experimented with adding lags of the (log) house price to the models presented, to 
investigate whether price effects are stronger if prices have been persistently high as a cohort 
approaches thirty than if they become high only near age thirty. We did not find significant 
evidence of such “dynamic price effects”: a single lag of anything between  one and five 
years was not significant and did not much affect the coefficient on the current price, while a 
formal statistical test indicated that even adding all five lags together did not significantly 
improve the explanatory power of the model. We conclude that the log of the current price is 
a sufficient control for price effects. 
The results (notably for the price effects) are quite robust. Similar results are obtained 
whether we use the survey weights or not, and whether we use data for Great Britain rather 
than for England alone.12 House price effects are slightly smaller in magnitude (less negative) 
                                                            
10 The credit conditions index used by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) runs until 2001 but has been 
extended. We get very similar results if we truncate the sample at 2001.  
11 Calculated as -0.1809 x 17. 
12 Full results are available on request. 
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if only national (as opposed to regional) house price variation is used. Omitting individual 
characteristics (couple and number of children) from the model makes the marginal house 
price effect a bit stronger, while adding a post-1980 dummy to the model reported in column 
1 produces a result for the house price variable that is very similar to that reported in column 
2. Estimating models of this kind separately for men and women reveals very little difference. 
If we split the sample by education groups, the lower educated exhibit a stronger association 
with house prices. 13 
[Table 1 about here] 
To summarize: homeownership rates at age thirty vary substantially across birth 
cohorts and the data support the idea that unfavourable housing market conditions in early 
adulthood are associated with delays in the transition of birth cohorts into homeownership. 
  
IV. Is There Ownership Rate Catch up After Thirty? 
We now turn to the question of whether those cohorts that were less able to get onto the 
ladder by thirty were nonetheless able to “catch up” with other cohorts at older ages. Do early 
differences in the rate of transition to homeownership persist into later life? This is a critical 
issue from a number of policy perspectives. For example, homeownership is a strong 
predictor economic security in retirement.  
Figure 7, in which we present homeownership rates at different ages across years, 
provides a first look at this question. The dashed blue line is the ownership rate for thirty 
year-olds, the dashed red line is this rate for forty year-olds, and so on with the solid grey line 
being the ownership rate among individuals aged seventy.  
We see that for each group there is a substantial increase in the proportion of owners 
during the period before 1990, a time trend that reflects the right to buy policy and credit 
market liberalization, among other things. After 1990, the homeownership rate for thirty year 
olds declines sharply, as we saw for the ownership rate of thirty year olds in the figures of 
Section III. This is a contrast to the ownership rates for other age groups, which stayed 
roughly constant or even continued to increase slowly. This contrast already suggests some 
catch up: individuals who were thirty in 1990 did not own substantially more when they were 
forty than was the case for those who were thirty five years later. Thus the higher ownership 
of the former group at thirty was offset by later transitions into owning for their successor 
cohort. 
                                                            
13 Full results are available on request. 
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[Figure 7 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes the variation in ownership rates across cohorts, at different ages. 
Panel (a) summarizes ownership rates at thirty and forty for those birth cohorts that we 
observe at both thirty and forty. Panel (b) does the same for ownership rates at thirty and fifty 
for the smaller set of cohorts that we observe at both those ages (see also Table A.1 in the 
Technical Appendix). The Table indicates that there is less dispersion in ownership rates 
across birth cohorts at older ages than at younger ages. This is again indicative of “catch up”.  
[Table 2 about here] 
To look more directly at catch up, in Figures 8 and 9, we plot increase in ownership 
between age thirty and age forty (in Figure 8) and between age thirty and age fifty (in Figure 
9) against ownership at age thirty.  In these figures, each point represents a birth-cohort (and 
the points are labeled by the birth year of the cohort). In each figure there are four panels. The 
top-left panel displays the relationship for cohorts defined by birth-year only (that is, for all 
of England). The remaining three panels repeat the analysis separately for each of three 
regions: North (top-right), Midlands (bottom-left) and South (bottom-right). 
[Figures 8 and 9 about here] 
Catch up implies a negative relationship: lower ownership at thirty must be associated 
with a greater subsequent increase and higher ownership at thirty with less subsequent 
increase. This is exactly what we see in Figure 8 (catch up by forty) and Figure 9 (catch up by 
fifty). The same pattern is observed at the national level and in each region. For example, in 
the top left panel of Figure 8, we see that the 1940 birth cohort (thirty in 1970) has a low 
homeownership rate at age thirty of 47% (see also Table A.1 in the Appendix) but 
experiences a substantial increase in homeownership – of 16 percentage points – between 
ages thirty and forty. In contrast, the 1954 birth cohort (thirty in 1984) has a much higher 
homeownership rate at age thirty of 71% but experiences very little increase in 
homeownership – just  2 percentage points – between ages thirty and forty.  
However, there is a potential problem with these figures. We know that ownership at 
thirty is measured with error. For each cohort, it is an estimate, based on the representative 
sample of that birth cohort found in the appropriate year of the FES/EFS. These estimates are 
naturally subject to sampling error, and this sampling error is effectively a kind of 
measurement error (Deaton, 1985). The ownership rate at thirty will be slightly over-
estimated for some cohorts, and slightly under estimated for others. This measurement error 
may affect the figures in two ways.  
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  First, ownership at thirty appears on the horizontal axis in each figure.  Measurement 
error in the horizontal variable creates attenuation bias and makes the relationship appear 
flatter than it actually is; in the case of a negative relationship like that documented in Figures 
8 and Figure 9, this means the slope is less negative than it should be, understating the true 
degree of catch up.   
Second, ownership at thirty is also used to construct the variable (change in 
ownership) on the vertical axis, which it enters negatively. Ownership rates at forty will be 
subject to sampling error as well, but because these are based (for each cohort) on an 
independent sample, the sample errors in ownership at forty will be unrelated to sampling 
errors in ownership at thirty. The way ownership at thirty features on both axes means that 
cohorts that have positive measurement errors in ownership at thirty will appear to have 
smaller subsequent increases in ownership. Measurement error in ownership at thirty 
therefore creates a spurious negative correlation between change in ownership (on the vertical 
axis) and ownership at thirty (on the horizontal axis.) This makes the relationship appear 
more negative than it actually is, overstating the true degree of catch up. (These arguments 
are formalized below). 
These two effects operate in opposite directions so that the direction of net bias in 
unclear. One might hope that they roughly cancel, but there is no guarantee that this is the 
case. Therefore, we next employ two methods that allow us to circumvent these measurement 
problems and quantify the degree of catch up. 14  
To quantify the catch up suggested by the figures we regress the change in the 
ownership rate between thirty and forty, on the ownership rate at age thirty. Catch up implies 
a negative coefficient on the initial condition (ownership at age thirty). If subsequent 
increases in homeownership are unrelated to ownership rates at thirty, then the coefficient on 
the latter should be zero. Complete catch up corresponds to a coefficient of minus one. In this 
case of complete catch up, cohort ownership rates at forty are not predicted by ownership at 
thirty. 
                                                            
14 Of course, we could graph the level of ownership at age 40 (or 50) against ownership at age 30 (rather than 
having growth in ownership on the vertical axis.) This would eliminate the 2nd of the two biases described in the 
text. The slope of the graph would then by one plus the degree of catch up. Similarly, the regressions described 
below could be run with the level of ownership at age 40 (or 50) as the dependent variable, rather than the 
“growth regression” specification we currently use. This would allow the formulas suggested in Deaton (1985) 
to be applied directly. We work with ownership growth for two reasons. First, because of the convenient “catch 
up” interpretation of the slope (or slope coefficient), and second, because of the possibility that the two biases 
described in the text may partially cancel out. While corrections can be applied to the regressions below in either 
form, this seemed the best way to approach the data graphically.  
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We focus on catch up between thirty and forty because this maximizes the number of 
birth-cohort observations we can use in estimation. (In a given set of survey years, not all 
birth-cohorts are seen at all ages, and more cohorts are observed at both ages thirty and forty 
than at ages thirty and fifty.) Note that, unlike the econometric model reported in Section III, 
which was estimated on individual level data, the model here is estimated on cohort -level 
data (each observation is a birth cohort of individuals). It is infeasible to estimate this growth 
model on the pooled individual data because each individual is observed only once: it is only 
the birth cohort that is observed at more than one age. We use a linear model this time 
because our dependent variable is not dichotomous but rather is measured in percentage 
points.  The results are presented in Table 3.  
We first estimate this model by ordinary least squares and the results of this 
estimation procedure are presented in column (1). In this regression the ownership rate at 
thirty is significant and negative – as we would expect given the figures in the previous 
subsection. The coefficient of -0.871 suggests that around 87% of the variation in birth cohort 
homeownership rates at age thirty is made up by age forty, and we cannot reject a coefficient 
of -1 (i.e. complete catch up). In column (2) we add to this model a time trend, a dummy for 
reaching thirty in or after 1981, and the fraction of the cohort that were in a couple at thirty. 
This results in a slightly larger estimate of the extent of catch up of about 93%. 
However, these ordinary least squares estimates suffer from exactly the same problem 
as was described for Figures 8 and 9. Biases arising from measurement error in ownership at 
age thirty may lead to either over- or underestimates of the degree of catch up.  
There are two possible approaches to overcoming these problems. The first approach 
is to re-estimate our regression model by two-stage least squares (2SLS), using the ownership 
rate at age twenty-nine as an instrument for our mis-measured independent variable, 
ownership at thirty. The ownership rate of a birth-cohort at age twenty-nine is very closely 
related to its ownership rate at thirty. The ownership rate at twenty-nine is measured with 
error, for the same reasons that the ownership rate at thirty is. However, because for each 
cohort the ownership rates at twenty-nine and thirty are based on different survey years (and 
hence independent samples), the measurement (or sampling) error in the ownership rate at 
twenty-nine should be unrelated to the measurement (or sampling) error in the ownership rate 
at thirty (and forty).  Thus the ownership rate at age twenty-nine is an ideal instrumental 
variable in this context.  
The results of this exercise are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. Relative 
to the OLS estimates, the point estimates of the catch up coefficient are somewhat diminished 
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in magnitude. For example, for the specification with no additional controls, the coefficient 
goes from -0.871 to -0.835 (so that estimated degree of catch up goes from 87% to 84%.)  
This suggests the net bias in the OLS estimate from measurement error is a small attenuation; 
consistent either with the two oppositely-signed biases described above either both being 
small, or of very similar magnitudes (and so offsetting). The key point is that the 2SLS 
estimate still suggests substantial catch up, although the coefficient is now much less 
precisely estimated. 
The second approach to overcome the measurement error bias is based on the 
observation that the coefficient of interest can be corrected for the measurement error if an 
estimate of the degree of measurement error (ߪ௨ଶ below) is available. In the case of pseudo-
panel analysis, as observed by Deaton (1985), such an estimate is available because the 
measurement error is just sampling error of the cohort-year cell mean, which can be 
estimated by standard methods.  
Deaton’s corrected estimators do not apply directly to our catch up regressions, but 
the formulas from that paper can easily be extended to our specification. In our case, the 
explanatory variable of interest (x*) is ownership at thirty, while the outcome of interest  
(y* − x*) is the change in ownership between thirty and forty.  For the univariate case, let x* 
and y* indicate true variables and let x and y be the variables we observe with errors u and v, 
respectively (omitting year subscripts for y, x, and ε): 
ݕ∗ െ ݔ∗ ൌ ߚݔ∗ ൅ ߝ 
ݕ ൌ ݕ∗ ൅ ݒ 
ݔ ൌ ݔ∗ ൅ ݑ 
We make standard assumptions about the structure of the model and of measurement 
errors: 
plim	ଵ௡෍	ݔ∗ߝ ൌ 	plim	
ଵ
௡෍	ݔ∗ݑ ൌ plim	
ଵ
௡෍	ݔ∗ݒ ൌ 0 
plim	ଵ௡෍	ݑߝ ൌ 	plim	
ଵ
௡෍	ݒߝ ൌ 0 
We denote variances and covariances of true variables and measurement error as  
plim	ଵ௡෍	ݔ∗	ଶ ൌ 	ߪ௫∗		ଶ								plim	
ଵ
௡෍	ݕ∗ݔ∗ ൌ 	ߪ௬∗௫∗ 
plim	ଵ௡෍	ݑଶ ൌ 	ߪ௨	ଶ								plim	
ଵ
௡෍	ݑݒ ൌ 	ߪ௨௩ 
In our case u and v are sampling errors from different independent samples so from 
now on we assume  ߪ௨௩ ൌ 0.  
The OLS estimator based on observed variables is (with sums taken over years) 
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ߚை௅ௌ ൌ 	 ቀ෍ݔଶቁ
ିଵ
෍ሺݕ െ ݔሻݔ 
(Note that throughout this Section and in our implementation of the estimator x and y 
variables are in deviations from means.) 
This estimator is not consistent, having  
plim	ߚை௅ௌ ൌ 	ߚߪ௫∗
		ଶ െ ߪ௨	ଶ
ߪ௫∗		ଶ ൅ ߪ௨	ଶ ൌ
ߚߪ௫∗		ଶ
ߪ௫∗		ଶ ൅ ߪ௨	ଶ 	െ	
ߪ௨	ଶ
ߪ௫∗		ଶ ൅ ߪ௨	ଶ	 
This last expression characterises the effects of the measurement error. The first 
element in the last sum above is standard attenuation bias due to measurement error in the x 
variable, and tends to make the estimator smaller in magnitude. The second element will tend 
to bias the estimator towards -1 (as the variance in the true x goes to zero).  
We can (and do, see column (5) of Table 3) correct the estimate using the following 
expression: 
ߚி௅ௌ ൌ 	 ቀ	෍ሺݔଶ െ ݏ௨	ଶሻቁ
ିଵ
෍൫ሺݕ െ ݔሻݔ ൅ ݏ௨	ଶ൯ 
where  ݏ௨	ଶ  is a consistent estimate of σ୳	ଶ. In our case, this is the variance of the cohort-year 
sample mean of ownership at thirty, which can be estimated from the pooled micro-data 
underlying the pseudo panel. In doing this, we weight cohort-year cells to allow for 
differences in cell size. 
Maintaining notation as much as possible (vectors in bold and t an index for year), the 
multivariate case is 
ݕ௧	∗ െ ݔଵ௧		∗ ൌ ࢚࢞∗ᇱࢼ ൅ ߝ௧ 
with ݔଵ௧ being the first element of the xt vector, which is ownership at thirty. 
The assumptions on the structure of the measurement error are such that the limiting 
distribution of the variance-covariance matrix of measurement errors is  
൬ߪ௩ଶ ૙′૙ ߑ௨௨൰ 
with 0 in this matrix again following from having sampling errors associated with 
independent samples and  Σuu  being the covariance matrix of the measurement error in the x 
variables (in our case, two of the x variables, the time trend and the dummy for year 1981 or 
after, are based on sample year and so measured without error). 
In this case, OLS estimator based on observed variables is again inconsistent, with 
plim	ࢼࡻࡸࡿ ൌ 	 ሺߑ௫∗௫∗ ൅ ߑ௨௨ሻିଵ൫ߑ௫∗௫∗ࢼ െ ࢛࢛࣌૚൯ 
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and ࢛࢛࣌૚ being the first column of  Σuu	, that is, the variance and covariances between the 
measurement errors in  x1 and in each x-variable. 
The feasible consistent estimator we use is then 
ሺܺᇱܺ െ ܶܵ௨௨ሻିଵ൫ܺᇱሺ࢟ െ ࢞૚ሻ ൅ ࢙࢛࢛ܶ૚൯ 
with X the x-variables stacked up by year and T the number of years (28 in our data),  Suu  a 
consistent estimate of  Σuu  and  ࢙࢛࢛૚ its first column. Again, these estimates come from the 
pooled micro-data.  
The results based on the estimators just described are presented in columns (5) and (6) 
of Table 3, along with bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 1000 replications). The 
coefficients on ownership at thirty are now -0.798 and -0.774, respectively, for the 
specifications without and with additional controls. These results are very much in line with 
the instrumental variables estimates. Both suggest a relatively small net effect of biases due 
to measurement error on the OLS estimate.   
  
[Table 4.2.1 about here] 
Taken together, these estimates, using two different methods to correct for possible 
measurement error bias, suggest a very robust result. There is substantial catch up, and 
cohorts with low homeownership rates at thirty have closed about 80% of the “ownership-
gap” by the time they reach age forty. 
While the analysis supports the hypothesis of “catch up” in homeownership rates, it 
does not rule out the possibility that ability to get on to the housing ladder by age thirty 
persistently affects the amount of housing assets that cohorts are ultimately able to purchase. 
To investigate this we used information on the number of rooms in accommodation as a 
proxy for the amount of housing owned. After controlling for a general upward drift over 
time in the recorded number of rooms in accommodation in our FES/EFS data, we were 
unable to find any significant evidence of a relationship between the level of ownership at 
age thirty and the number of rooms owned, on average, by age forty (regression results 
available on request). To the extent that this failure to find evidence reflects that there is little 
or no relationship between the two variables (rather than that cohort data do not provide 
enough observations to investigate this relationship in detail), this result supports the idea that 
cohorts who are less able to get onto the housing ladder by thirty are not subsequently scarred 
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in terms of the amount of housing assets that they are able to buy. Thus we can think of these 
results as additional, albeit weak, evidence in favour of the “catch up” hypothesis.15 
There still remain other aspects of housing careers that we have not analysed. Ability 
to get on to the housing ladder by thirty may affect the age by which households are able to 
become outright owners (without mortgages). The EFS/FES surveys do also contain 
information on this. However, preliminary analysis of the data indicated that there is little 
point in looking at outright ownership before about age sixty. There are only nine cohorts that 
we observe both at thirty and at sixty. Any analysis of the effect of housing market conditions 
in early adulthood on outcomes at age sixty would therefore be based on this very small 
number of birth-year cohorts and, importantly, would not be based on multiple housing 
booms and busts. Thus a credible examination of such issues may require different data or 
methods.  
              
V. Conclusions   
Due to the fact that England experiences significant house price volatility, with booms and 
busts, different birth cohorts have experienced very different housing market conditions in 
early adulthood. It is natural to ask whether these fluctuations have been associated with 
different homeownership outcomes for the birth cohorts that experienced them, and whether 
the differences, if present, persist into later life.   
There are number of ways that one could address these questions. In this paper we 
have investigated these questions empirically, employing successive FES/EFS surveys over 
almost forty years, in conjunction with synthetic cohort methods. These data and methods 
allow us to track the ownership rates of different birth cohorts over a time period that 
captures three housing booms, and two housing busts.  
We find that, over the past forty years, ownership rates at age thirty have varied 
substantially across birth cohorts. This variation is negatively correlated with house prices, 
but the relationship seems stronger before 1990 than subsequently. These patterns are 
common to men and women, and to the different regions of England. They are more 
pronounced in the south than nationally.  Overall, our results suggest that when a birth cohort 
faces house prices that are one standard deviation (or 17 percentage points) above trend in 
early adulthood, than the homeownership rate of that birth cohort at age thirty is 
approximately 2 percentage points lower.   
                                                            
15 Full details available on request. 
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There has been a secular decline in ownership at age thirty from the early-1990s on. 
This is associated with a coincident decline in the fraction of thirty year olds in couple 
households. It could be that causality runs from household formation to housing demand, or 
from housing prices or supply to household formation, or both, or neither.  
Those birth cohorts that were less likely to get onto the ladder by thirty were 
nonetheless subsequently able to “catch up”, to a large degree, with cohorts that experienced 
more favourable initial conditions. Measurement error means that the raw correlation 
between ownership at thirty and subsequent growth in ownership, may misstate the true 
degree of catch up. Nevertheless, two different econometric methods which address that 
problem, and ancillary evidence, suggest that the apparent catch up is real. Cohorts with low 
homeownership rates at thirty have closed about 80% of the “ownership-gap” by the time 
they reach age forty. 
As with any analysis, ours has limitations. An obvious limitation of the analysis in 
this paper is that it only documents the association of housing market conditions with the 
experiences of successive cohorts of young adults, and stops short of drawing causal 
inferences. While these associations are certainly suggestive of an effect of housing market 
conditions on outcomes, it is quite possible that there are important effects that run in the 
opposite direction - from the size and characteristics of different birth cohorts reaching young 
adulthood to housing market conditions. Disentangling these different effects is important, 
but beyond the scope of this paper. It is nevertheless important to document, as this paper 
does, the key facts on cohort homeownership, both as a basis for further empirical work, and 
as targets for any structural modeling to match.  
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Appendix 
a. Data details 
(i) House-price data 
Throughout this paper the house price data that we have used are based house price indices 
published by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), and freely 
available via 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/livetables/. The 
main indices that we use are published in table 590 from the above link in the section on the 
housing market and house prices, under the subheading house price index. The indices are 
mix adjusted, where the mix adjustment is to allow for the fact that the composition of house 
types traded in the housing market changes from year to year (e.g. some years a higher 
proportion of large detached properties are traded, other years flat sales are more important). 
We use quarterly data that are available since quarter two of 1968. The data include separate 
series for the UK, for England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and for English regions 
(nine “government office regions”). In the main we use the series for England, or the series 
for English regions, depending on which is appropriate to the analysis.  
To convert from the price index into a price level, we use mix-adjusted prices for quarter 1 
(February) of 2002, which are also published by and freely available from DCLG.  
To convert these nominal house prices in real prices we deflate using the all-item Retail 
Prices Index, and we deflate to December 2007 prices (2007 is the latest year in our FES data 
on ownership). The RPI data are published by the Office for National Statistics, and we have 
monthly data. To deflate the quarterly house price series we use the (mean) average of the 
RPI for the 3 months corresponding to each quarter. 
Though the basis is the house price data is quarter two of 1968 to quarter one of 2009, not 
all the English regions have data for the full period due to changes in the drawing of regional 
boundaries. In particular the North-East, East (i.e East Anglia) and South East series are 
available from quarter two of 1992, while the North West series is available from quarter one 
of 1999. When exploiting regional data, we either drop region-years in which the house price 
is not available, or, for the figures plotting the house price and ownership in broad English 
regions, we construct the price series based on only a subset of the more narrow regions that 
are the constituent parts of our broader regions. 
(ii) Credit Conditions Index 
As mentioned in the main text, the Credit Conditions Index (CCI) that we use in 
specification 3 of table 1, comes from Fernandez Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). Their 
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index is constructed, for the period from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s, as the common 
underlying influence on ten measures of credit conditions. These measures include aggregate 
unsecured debt and mortgages, and age and region specific measures of the fraction of high 
loan-to-income, and value-to-income, mortgages. The ten equation system that is estimated 
includes controls for a comprehensive set of economic and demographic influences on the 
demand and supply of credit. Thus the unified CCI that is derived captures the common 
variation in the ten credit indicators which cannot be explained by the economic and 
demographic controls. It is this index that we use in our analysis. Full details of it and its 
construction are provided in Fernandez Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). 
b. Synthetic-Cohort Analysis: checking for group consistency 
 As mentioned above, before we apply synthetic cohort analyses to regional 
samples, we need to conduct some checks on the data to make sure it is valid to do so.  
The cohort methods hinge on cohort composition remaining constant over time. 
Random samples of fifty year-olds in 1980 and 60-years olds in 1990 are informative about 
the average experience of individuals in the 1930 birth cohort if the set of people in the 
population with that characteristic (born in 1930) is fairly constant between 1980 and 1990. If 
that is not the case then changes in the homeownership rate between 1980 and 1990 will 
confound changes in the homeownership rate among the individuals that the 1980 sample 
was drawn from with changes in the composition of the cohort.  
At a national level, the main threats to the validity of this assumption are (i) 
immigration, (ii) emigration, and (iii) differential mortality. For example, suppose that the 
1930 birth-cohort experiences some mortality between 1980 and 1990 and that this mortality 
is concentrated in amongst those with lower socioeconomic status and wealth. As these 
people are less likely to own homes this can lead to a rise in the homeownership rate of the 
cohort even though there is no change in the homeownership probability of any given 
individual in the cohort. As we are ultimately interested in the life-course experience of 
individuals, we would consider this a spurious selection (or compositional) effect. Similar 
effects arise if, for example, immigrants who join a cohort as it ages have lower (or higher) 
homeownership rates than the native born. 
Turning to regional analysis, we face two main difficulties. First, if we look at smaller 
regions then the available sample for any given birth cohort in any given survey year can be 
quite small. These small cell sizes then lead to considerable sampling variation in the 
homeownership rate of a given birth-cohort, at a given age, in a given region. The resulting 
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age paths of homeownership are therefore be potentially quite noisy, with meaningless year-
on-year variations.  
The second problem is that threats to the validity of the constant birth cohort 
composition assumption are potentially more severe at the regional level. This is because 
inter-regional migration might be greater than international migration.  
There is a way to check these issues internally in the data. The idea is to use the data 
to track across age a characteristic (or characteristics) of a birth-cohort (or birth/region 
cohort) that we believe should be constant. If cohort composition does change over time, we 
might expect this to be manifest in these age profiles. To implement this idea, we organized 
the data for England into three large regions (South, Midlands and North) and within each 
region, into 10-year birth cohorts. We then examine two features of each cohort as it ages: 
cohort size, and the fraction of individuals in the cohort who left full-time education at or 
after age 18. Changes in estimated cohort size would reflect mortality as well as migration 
into and out of the region. The fraction of individuals in the cohort who left full-time 
education at or after age 18 should of course be roughly constant after age 18 and if it 
changes as the cohort ages this would indicate either differential mortality or that higher (or 
lower) education individuals are being added (or subtracted) from the cohort by migration.  
The results of this analysis are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2. As always we have 
been careful to use the survey weights in all calculations. Figure A.1 shows the estimated 
cohort size for a set of cohorts defined by region of residence (South, Midlands, North) and 
10 year birth cohort (1930s, 1940s, 1950s, 1960s). Size is on the vertical axis and age on the 
horizontal axis. Vertical differences between cohort lines indicate “cohort effects.” For 
example, particularly in the South, the 1960s birth cohort (in yellow) is significantly larger 
than the 1930s cohort (in blue). The line for each cohort traces out the age profile for that 
cohort. This figure shows some mild decline in estimated cohort size as each cohort ages, 
which probably reflects a combination of mortality and net emigration. There is some 
suggestion of an accelerated decline in cohort size past age 65 (which we see in our data only 
for the 1930s cohort) which might be consistent with accelerating mortality or emigration 
associated with retirement.  
[Figure A.1 and A.2 about here] 
The key point that we draw from Figure A.1, however, is that changes in estimated 
cohort size are quite modest (at least before age 65) and very similar across birth cohorts and 
regions. We would have been rather more concerned if Figure A.1 showed cohorts in one 
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region growing while cohorts in other regions shrank, indicating substantial net migration 
between regions. This does not, however, appear to be the case.  
Figure A.2 follows the same pattern but traces out the fraction of individuals in the 
cohort who left full-time education at or after age 18. The age profiles of the different cohorts 
are fairly noisy, and perhaps exhibit some small upward trend with age. The latter would be 
consistent with differential mortality (higher socioeconomic status individuals having greater 
life-expectancy) and/or some incidence of older individuals returning to school. The main 
point again is that the age effects do not appear to be dramatic, and do not appear to differ 
significantly across regions. 
It would certainly be possible to push this analysis further, for example by subjecting 
the age profiles apparent in these figures to formal statistical tests. But our conclusion from 
these figures is that analysis at the level of broad regions is feasible, and the constant 
composition assumption is no more dangerous at this level of region than at the level of 
England as a whole. On the other hand, the sampling variability in age profiles apparent 
especially in A.2 suggests to us that, due to small sample sizes, analysis at the level of more 
disaggregated regions would not be advisable.  
c. Further Descriptive Statistics 
This subsection provides further detail on the pseudo-panel data constructed from 
successive FES/EFS surveys.  
[Tables A.1 and A.2 about here]
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Figure 1: Log real house prices in England, 1968 – 2009 (quarterly) 
 
Notes: DCLG data for the mix-adjusted house price series (quarterly), deflated by the authors using the all item retail prices index. 
The final data point shown is 2009, Q1. More detail on the price data is available in the technical appendix to this paper. The 
vertical axis is labeled in (2007) pounds, although the axis is plotted on a logarithmic scale. A (very similar) U.K. version of the 
figure is available from the authors on request.  
 
Figure 2: Average mortgage advance to price ratios in the UK, 1969 - 2008 
 
Notes: Data are available from DCLG 
(http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/housingmarket/livetables/). Note that there is a 
change in 1988 from taking ratios of averages to taking average ratios (see note 2 to table 517 at the above link). 
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Figure 3: Local authority housing stock sold through the right to buy scheme in England,  
1980 - 2009 
 
Notes: This chart uses data and reproduces a figure that are published by the Department for Communities and Local Government: see chart 
671 via http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/socialhousingsales/livetables/ 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of individuals aged thirty who are owner-occupiers, and log real (mix-adjusted) house 
price, 1971-2007, England. 
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Figure 5(a): Proportion of men and women aged thirty who are owner-occupiers, and log real (mix-adjusted) 
house price, 1971-2007, England 
 
 
Figure 5(b): Proportion of men and women aged thirty who are owner-occupiers, and log real (mix-
adjusted) house price, 1971-2007, by region. 
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Figure 5(c): Proportion of individuals aged thirty and living in couples who are owner-occupiers, and log real 
(mix-adjusted) house price, 1971-2007, England 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of individuals aged thirty who are owner-occupiers, with the same by couple status, and 
the proportion of thirty-year olds who are in couples, 1971-2007, England. 
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Figure 7: Ownership rates at different ages by year: all individuals, England 
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Figure 8: Catch up by forty? 
Ownership change (rate at forty – rate at thirty), against ownership at thirty, 
England and regions 
 
Figure 9: Catch up by fifty? 
Ownership change (rate at fifty – rate at thirty), against ownership at thirty, 
England and regions 
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Figure A.1: Population sizes by broad region for (10year) cohorts 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Proportion who left full-time education at or after age 18 
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Table 1:  Probit Regression for Ownership at Thirty, Pooled Data for England: Dependent Variable: Ownership at thirty 
 
Regressor 
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
Marginal 
effect 
 
 
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
Marginal 
effect  
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
Marginal 
effect  
             
Log real house price -0.4698(0.1087)
*** -0.1809  -0.3060(0.1342)
** -0.1167  -0.3844(0.1405)
*** -0.1461  
Real interest rate 0.0067(0.0078)
 0.0026  -0.0037(0.0154)
 -0.0014  -0.0145(0.0212)
 -0.0055  
Credit Conditions Index   0.0799(0.4021)
 0.0304  
             
Time trend -0.0035(0.0092)
 -0.0013  -0.0793(0.0195)
*** -0.0302  -0.0885(0.0234)
*** -0.0336  
RTB sales this year 0.2979(0.0641)
*** 0.1147  0.2871(0.0765)
*** 0.1095  0.3249(0.1141)
*** 0.1235  
Cumulative RTB sales 0.0108(0.0162)
 0.0041  0.1122(0.0286)
*** 0.0428  0.1259(0.0305)
*** 0.0478  
Log family income 0.9245(0.0589)
*** 0.3560  0.9191(0.0629)
*** 0.3505  0.8917(0.0643)
*** 0.3390  
Female (0/1) 0.1036(0.0346)
*** 0.0399  0.0720(0.0395)
* 0.0275  0.0757(0.0415)
* 0.0288  
Couple (0/1) 0.6617(0.0558)
*** 0.2574  0.6216(0.0603)
*** 0.2405  0.6466(0.0632)
*** 0.2497  
Number of kids -0.1306(0.0181)
*** -0.0503  -0.0106(0.0212)
*** -0.0404  -0.1182(0.0222)
*** -0.0449  
Post-compuls Educ (0/1)  0.2243(0.0460)
*** 0.0856  0.2216(0.0479)
*** 0.0842  
             
Sample and sample size 
Pseudo r-squared 
1969 – 2007, 5687 
0.2111 
1978 – 2007, 4623 
0.2292 
1978 – 2005, 4328 
0.2251 
Notes: (a) Eight region dummies and a constant are included in all specifications; (b) Standard errors clustered at the region-year level;  
(c) Marginal effects measured at means of independent variables; (d) ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Ownership Rate, Selected Ages and Cohorts, England 
 
 
 Mean Variance Median Minimum 
observed 
Maximum 
observed 
Ownership Rate at Age Thirty and Forty, Among Cohorts Observed at Both Ages 
Note: Based on 29 observations at each age, (1979-2007 for age 40, 1969-1987 for age 30). 
Age 40 0.729 0.0019 0.737 0.631 0.817 
Age 30 0.609 0.0030 0.618 0.468 0.713 
Ownership Rate at Age Thirty and Fifty Among Cohorts Observed at Both Ages 
Note: Based on 19 observations at each age, (1989-2007 for age 50, 1969-1997 for age 30). 
Age 50 0.793 0.0013 0.801 0.729 0.863 
Age 30 0.591 0.0029 0.589 0.468 0.713 
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Table 3: Catch up Regression Estimates 
Dependent variable: change in ownership rate, age forty minus age thirty, England 
 
 OLS Two-Stage Least Squares1 Measurement Error correction2 
 
 
Regressor 
(1) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(2) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(3) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(4) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(5) 4 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 3 
(6) 4 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 3 
Ownership at age 30 
 
Time trend 
 
Year 1981 or after (0/1) 
 
 Couple (0/1) at age 30 
 
Constant 
 
-0.871 
(-1.162,-0.579) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.654 
(0.475,0.833) 
 
-0.926 
(-1.366,-0.487) 
-0.001 
(-0.006,0.003) 
0.027 
(-0.051,0.105) 
0.008 
(-0.498,0.514) 
0.684 
(0.251,1.117) 
-0.835 
(-1.499,-0.172) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.632 
(0.226,1.039) 
-0.783 
(-1.684,0.118) 
-0.002 
(-0.006,0.003) 
-0.015 
(-0.081,0.112) 
-0.040 
(-0.557,0.476) 
0.644 
(0.206,1.083) 
-0.798 
(-1.224,-0.517) 
 
-0.774 
(-1.751,0.017) 
-0.001 
(-0.006,0.004) 
0.021 
(-0.081,0.131) 
0.070 
(-1.076,0.917) 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
28 
0.59 
 
28 
0.60 
 
28 
0.59 
 
28 
0.60 
 
28 
 
28 
1In the table the coefficients of only the second stage are reported. In the first stage ownership at thirty is regressed on the same regressors 
included in the second stage, plus ownership at twenty-nine. Ownership at twenty-nine is the “excluded variable” and has a coefficient of 
0.371 (s.e. 0.164) for the specification of column (3) and of 0.305 (s.e. 0.136) for column (4). 
2 Details on the methodology adopted for the measurement error correction are provided in Section IV.  
3 Confidence intervals for the estimates with measurement error correction are obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications, strata:  age and 
year of birth). 
4 No constant is reported since estimates are based on data in deviations from means 
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Table A.1 Ownership Rates, Ages thirty‐fifty 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
       |                                            Year of Birth                                                                                          
  Year | 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967  
-------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  1969 | .533                                                                                                                                              
  1970 | .595 .468                                                                                                                                         
  1971 | .512 .557 .586                                                                                                                                    
  1972 | .578 .589 .602 .545                                                                                                                               
  1973 | .559 .598 .574  .58 .581                                                                                                                          
  1974 | .601 .606 .561 .664   .6 .563                                                                                                                     
  1975 | .635 .613 .653 .599 .574 .601 .617                                                                                                                
  1976 | .629 .603 .632  .66 .642 .642 .585 .589                                                                                                           
  1977 | .628 .644 .546 .613 .573  .69 .636 .639  .62                                                                                                      
  1978 | .638 .621 .668 .642 .633 .624 .652 .679 .622 .571                                                                                                 
  1979 | .632  .69 .672 .659 .738 .654 .633 .727 .588 .644 .557                                                                                            
  1980 | .683 .631 .701 .635  .69 .706 .681 .648 .656  .61  .67 .543                                                                                       
  1981 | .553 .636 .696 .667  .66 .659 .693 .651 .689 .639 .655  .62 .593                                                                                  
  1982 | .668 .642  .68 .675  .66 .737  .72 .681 .693 .672 .681 .663 .696 .591                                                                             
  1983 | .687 .662 .738 .718 .753  .79 .721 .772 .778 .735 .663 .673 .739 .641 .635                                                                        
  1984 | .774 .719 .739 .717 .684 .737 .719 .698 .759 .693 .731  .71 .686  .61 .599 .713                                                                   
  1985 | .719 .766  .72 .693 .683 .741 .721 .755 .784 .736 .704 .762 .743 .721 .677 .613 .664                                                              
  1986 |  .73 .746  .75 .797  .79 .783 .771  .72 .684 .717 .746 .728 .761 .754 .702 .691 .669 .618                                                         
  1987 | .786 .711 .766 .767  .78 .758 .817 .769 .793 .746 .739 .707 .742 .724 .737  .64 .683 .682 .635                                                    
  1988 | .736 .709 .794 .737 .756  .81 .771 .757  .78 .762 .801 .717 .753 .707  .73 .636  .74 .702 .605 .653                                               
  1989 | .801 .697 .766  .76 .774 .802  .77 .792 .778 .758 .786 .789 .722  .78 .748 .724 .747 .703 .656 .699 .675                                          
  1990 |      .762 .786 .786 .803 .836 .795 .796 .822 .814 .842 .688 .774  .78 .772 .749 .742 .739 .795 .702 .717 .649                                     
  1991 |           .805 .762 .797 .783 .817 .798 .848 .726 .784 .767 .817 .829  .79 .765 .755 .736 .712 .724 .676 .743 .704                                
  1992 |                .805 .837 .762 .811 .846 .807 .798 .805 .761 .758 .766 .701 .699 .769 .679 .692 .767 .678 .676 .637 .656                           
  1993 |                     .858 .796 .853 .824 .843 .769 .752 .794 .777  .75 .757 .686 .767 .721 .757 .674 .756 .684 .667 .671 .623                      
  1994 |                          .818 .851 .833 .825 .803 .814  .83 .737 .826 .747 .734 .759 .817 .708 .696 .699  .75 .682 .684 .633 .666                 
  1995 |                               .804 .775 .769 .787 .767 .867 .796 .724 .725 .769 .732 .772 .717 .682  .75  .73 .745 .679 .697 .616 .643            
  1996 |                                    .833 .804 .834   .8 .733 .797 .803 .722 .752 .774 .761 .824 .679 .685 .675 .674  .69  .59 .608 .644 .556       
  1997 |                                         .786 .818 .823 .793 .754 .778  .82 .779 .716 .744 .753 .729 .764 .754 .737 .695  .67 .648 .744 .585 .625  
  1998 |                                               .76 .802 .816 .801   .8 .774  .78 .758 .759  .76 .705 .667 .718 .725 .705 .699 .631 .711 .668 .629  
  1999 |                                                   .766 .809  .78   .8 .825 .808   .8 .767 .756 .694 .755 .772 .752 .723 .768 .683 .649 .675 .668  
  2000 |                                                        .758 .806 .783 .833 .747 .847 .803 .714 .743 .772 .746 .705 .756 .691 .712 .665 .744 .714  
  2001 |                                                             .763 .772 .806 .786 .797 .823  .78 .779 .717 .694 .681 .764 .714 .717 .669 .705 .697  
  2002 |                                                                  .813 .843 .822 .844 .794 .829 .776 .795 .736 .753 .747 .753 .745 .702 .736 .632  
  2003 |                                                                       .815 .828 .814 .784 .776 .802 .792 .769 .777 .769 .741 .737 .719 .782  .76  
  2004 |                                                                            .763 .787 .771 .829 .794 .743 .765 .716 .759  .73 .701 .686  .71  .69  
  2005 |                                                                                 .863  .75  .79 .813 .791 .766 .728 .737 .717 .749 .712 .697 .763  
  2006 |                                                                                      .729 .797 .815 .794 .779 .749 .755 .775 .782  .75 .752 .731  
  2007 |                                                                                           .772 .793 .736 .758 .781 .766  .72 .716 .737 .725   .7  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table A.2 Cell Sizes 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
       |                                               Year of Birth                                                                                       
  year | 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967  
-------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  1969 |  222                                                                                                                                              
  1970 |  183  180                                                                                                                                         
  1971 |  239  222  222                                                                                                                                    
  1972 |  187  214  215  221                                                                                                                               
  1973 |  204  189  212  202  245                                                                                                                          
  1974 |  191  187  192  214  229  210                                                                                                                     
  1975 |  208  208  196  206  247  232  247                                                                                                                
  1976 |  204  201  185  219  188  233  241  235                                                                                                           
  1977 |  199  210  184  210  204  204  244  272  325                                                                                                      
  1978 |  178  184  184  193  228  197  202  203  301  282                                                                                                 
  1979 |  194  162  185  188  204  224  217  216  251  266  256                                                                                            
  1980 |  171  171  170  217  219  250  239  250  262  269  207  234                                                                                       
  1981 |  209  192  184  219  221  248  274  247  322  302  273  273  247                                                                                  
  1982 |  191  212  190  199  215  218  267  261  334  280  252  252  255  220                                                                             
  1983 |  176  186  200  168  206  212  228  219  309  262  261  234  229  223  227                                                                        
  1984 |  174  177  189  190  204  218  198  175  230  230  227  240  239  243  199  246                                                                   
  1985 |  164  166  158  190  191  165  196  215  275  262  259  235  238  217  215  215  228                                                              
  1986 |  151  155  166  190  191  218  182  235  234  223  219  223  228  211  226  229  236  234                                                         
  1987 |  157  167  141  164  199  202  199  208  247  267  234  241  236  219  254  210  235  229  259                                                    
  1988 |  169  170  150  183  167  188  226  240  265  256  227  218  217  197  249  242  202  216  212  211                                               
  1989 |  162  161  157  163  182  197  220  222  269  237  250  205  230  186  216  244  204  212  228  216  230                                          
  1990 |       136  135  144  172  204  176  179  230  226  202  211  188  199  186  193  228  222  218  202  246  223                                     
  1991 |            134  155  181  178  200  208  202  179  200  178  202  204  211  199  198  199  234  234  209  208  196                                
  1992 |                 155  211  179  203  200  273  229  195  218  189  202  220  214  211  220  246  235  248  238  267  243                           
  1993 |                      167  161  176  176  234  222  190  175  192  163  198  194  193  212  212  216  240  196  245  216  265                      
  1994 |                           170  149  164  229  220  203  182  192  182  178  197  195  198  211  227  216  207  198  225  222  228                 
  1995 |                                144  188  219  213  181  182  188  165  198  202  178  187  205  210  209  212  229  225  236  255  235            
  1996 |                                     172  196  193  189  149  160  173  153  190  180  187  184  202  235  199  213  251  238  241  241  224       
  1997 |                                          204  168  160  180  162  170  152  181  180  176  185  178  228  211  234  229  222  202  241  211  194  
  1998 |                                               159  170  145  169  153  146  152  152  199  175  194  172  189  197  186  209  212  212  199  194  
  1999 |                                                    165  158  178  131  169  180  166  166  177  179  197  185  177  202  204  226  207  227  246  
  2000 |                                                         179  160  152  163  180  165  152  152  155  151  164  195  163  189  181  218  217  203  
  2001 |                                                              174  164  178  180  174  206  185  203  196  210  249  204  237  237  242  244  205  
  2002 |                                                                   177  181  157  155  176  170  191  160  192  221  197  210  216  210  214  228  
  2003 |                                                                        156  174  159  172  200  169  188  189  193  206  227  246  223  207  190  
  2004 |                                                                             163  153  177  175  186  186  190  195  216  213  224  195  191  190  
  2005 |                                                                                  141  155  166  180  183  191  188  178  212  198  217  212  217  
  2006 |                                                                                       133  169  178  189  162  189  200  210  186  192  202  169  
  2007 |                                                                                            165  149  168  158  163  190  169  161  164  175  153  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
